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TACTICAL SELF-FUNDED ERISA
EMPLOYERS UNNECESSARILY THREATEN
EMPLOYEES' RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT
REVIEW OF AN HMO'S MEDICAL
NECESSITY DETERMINATION WITH
PREEMPTION
L. DARNELL WEEDENt
INTRODUCTION
The issue presented is whether the recent Supreme Court
decision in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran1 allows states
to grant a patient the right of external review on the issue of
medical necessity under ERISA without the fear of preemption. 2
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rush Prudential HMO,
Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 3 asserted that a
state law granting a patient the right to external review of a
denial of health benefits in an employer-sponsored plan was
preempted by ERISA. 4 The Supreme Court rejected the position
t Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University;
B.A., J.D., University of Mississippi. I would like to thank Professor Tanya Kateri
Hernandez of Rutgers Law School-Newark; Marva 0. Coward, Public Services
Coordinator Thurgood Marshall School of Law Library; and Julie Congress,
Research Assistant at Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Class of 2004, for their
valuable comments concerning earlier drafts of this Article.
1 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002).
2 Id. at 2156.
3 Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 536 (5th Cir.
2000) (describing the Texas statute as "squarely within the ambit of ERISA's
preemptive reach"), motion for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc
denied, 220 F.3d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated and remanded by Montemayor v.
Corporate Health Ins., 122 S. Ct. 2617 (2002).
4 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). The statute provides in relevant part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
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taken by the Fifth Circuit. 5 In this important decision, the Court
adopted the assertion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit 6 by holding that section 4-10 of the Illinois Health
Maintenance Organization Act providing an independent
medical review of specific HMO's medical necessity decisions in
an employer-sponsored health plan is not preempted under
ERISA.7
The basic legal right to have an independent third-party
review a determination by an HMO that a claim is being denied
because of the lack of medical necessity is a significant issue
because at least forty states provide this right.8 The right to
external review is a substantial federal issue for those patients
who seek medical care under employer-sponsored ERISA
employee benefit plans because of the implications of federal
preemption. 9 In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., the Supreme Court
has taken a major step in giving states the right to expand a
patient's right to independent external review on the question of
medical necessity without fear of preemption by ERISA. 10 As a
general rule, ERISA's deemer clause prohibits a state from
applying its insurance regulations to self-funded plans.1
Part I of this Article presents the facts and procedural
setting for the legal disputes addressed by the Supreme Court in
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. with a brief analysis of the Court's
rationale for refusing to apply ERISA's preemptive arm. Part II
of this Article presents an analysis of the Supreme Court's
rationale for its decision in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. Part III
discusses why a state's medical necessity review insurance
regulations must be protected from illusory ERISA self-funded
benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under
section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1,
1975.
Id.
5 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2158.
6 Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir. 2000), afl'd,
122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002).
7 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2156.
8 See id. at 2161.
9 See L. Darnell Weeden, HMOs, ERISA's "Relate to" Preemption and a
Patient's Right to an External Review of Medical Necessity Decisions and the
Implications of Field and Conflict Preemption, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 207,
211 (2002).
10 See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2156.
11 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990).
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benefit plans. Part III examines whether the rationale of
Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller12 allows a state to use
medical necessity review insurance regulations to impose
conditions on the right to insure ERISA self-funded benefit plans
without violating the deemer clause.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SETTING FOR THE LEGAL DISPUTES
IN RUSH PRUDENTIAL HMO, INC. V. MORAN
A. Facts
Rush Prudential HMO is a health maintenance organization
(HMO) 13 that enters into agreements offering medical services to
employee benefit plans under ERISA. 14 Debra Moran was an
insured under Rush Prudential HMO's plan through her
husband's employer.15 In 1996, Mrs. Moran underwent
conservative treatments from her primary care physician, Dr.
Arthur LaMarre. Moran's conservative treatment included
physiotherapy for the pain and numbness existing in her right
shoulder.16 In October of 1997, Rush Prudential was requested
to approve Dr. LaMarre's proposal that another doctor not
affiliated with Prudential, Dr. Julia Terzis, perform suregery on
her shoulder. 17 This procedure was considered an
unconventional course of treatment. Rush Prudential
12 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1476 (2003).
13 The definition of an HMO has been forced to evolve as quickly as the number
of emerging applications. Traditionally, an HMO was defined as an entity that
financed and delivered complete health care services to enrollees for a prepaid fee
per enrollee. No longer, however, can an HMO be defined by prepaid financing. A
contemporary definition acknowledges that an HMO is also a health plan that
possesses primary care physicians as gatekeepers and shifts varying degrees of
financial risk for medical expenses to providers. Subscribers who enroll in an HMO
are generally restricted to utilizing the participating providers in order to receive
full plan coverage. Jay M. Howard, The Aftermath of HMO Insolvency:
Considerations for Providers, 4 ANNALS HEALTH L. 87, 89-90 (citing 42 U.S.C. §
300e (1988) and Peter R. Kongstvedt, Glossary of Terms, Jargon, and Common
Acronyms, in THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 504 (Peter R. Kongstvedt
ed., 2d ed. 1993)). The Illinois law describes a "Health Maintenance Organization"
as "any organization formed under the laws of this or another state to provide or
arrange for one or more health care plans under a system which causes any part of
the risk of health care delivery to be borne by the organization or its providers." 215
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/1-2 (9) (West 2000).
14 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2156.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See id.
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determined that it was not a medical necessity and denied Mrs.
Moran's request to pay for the surgery,18 despite her primary
care physician's conclusion that the unconventional treatment by
Dr. Terzis was in her best medical interest. Rush's denial of
Moran's claim for payment for the unconventional surgery was
not consistent with her primary care physician's
recommendation that she have the surgery. Rush offered an
alternative course of treatment that was considered the standard
surgery for her condition. 19 In January of 1998, Mrs. Moran
requested in writing an independent medical review of her claim
as provided for under section 4-10(a) of the Illinois HMO Act.20
B. Procedural History
Rush refused to provide Mrs. Moran the requested
independent review, and Mrs. Moran sued Rush Prudential
HMO in state court under the Illinois HMO Act for its failure to
grant her the requested independent review under the Act. 21
Rush Prudential successfully removed Mrs. Moran's suit to
federal district court on the ground that Illinois's HMO Act was
preempted by ERISA.22 As she was awaiting the outcome of the
litigation, Mrs. Moran had the surgery performed by Dr. Terzis,
which she paid for herself, and presented a $94,841.27
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See id.; see also 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10(a) (West 2000). The
statute provides in relevant part:
Medical Necessity-Dispute Resolution-Independent Second Opinion.
Each Health Maintenance Organization shall provide a mechanism for the
timely review by a physician holding the same class of license as the
primary care physician, who is unaffiliated with the Health Maintenance
Organization, jointly selected by the patient (or the patient's next of kin or
legal representative if the patient is unable to act for himself), primary
care physician and the Health Maintenance Organization in the event of a
dispute between the primary care physician and the Health Maintenance
Organization regarding the medical necessity of a covered service proposed
by a primary care physician. In the event that the reviewing physician
determines the covered service to be medically necessary, the Health
Maintenance Organization shall provide the covered service. Future
contractual or employment action by the Health Maintenance
Organization regarding the primary care physician shall not be based
solely on the physician's participation in this procedure.
Id.
21 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2156-57; see also 215 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 125/4-10(a).
22 See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2157.
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repayment claim to Rush.23 Rush handled the repayment claim
as a converted request for benefits and started a new
investigation to decide the coverage issue presented by Mrs.
Moran's repayment request.24 Three doctors with whom Rush
conferred concluded that Mrs. Moran's surgery was not
medically necessary. 25 In the meantime, Mrs. Moran persuaded
the federal district court to send the case back to state court 26 on
the ground that her demand for independent review under
section 4-10 did not involve an interpretation of the provisions of
an ERISA plan. 27
Mrs. Moran's claim was not so "completely preempted" as to
authorize removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because her request
for a review was not considered by the federal court as a
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., No. 98-C-0442, 1998 WL 325204,
at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 1998).
27 See id. Specifically, the Moran court stated that
Debra C. Moran ('Moran") filed a complaint for specific performance in
the Circuit Court of Cook County against Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.
("Rush").... On January 26, 1998, Rush removed the case to federal court
on the grounds that Moran's state law claim was completely preempted by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). Moran
moves to remand this case to the Circuit Court of Cook County
The parties dispute whether section 4-10 of the HMO Act falls outside the
scope of complete preemption through application of ERISA's "savings
clause."
"If a state law claim has been 'displaced' and therefore completely
preempted by § 502(a), then a plaintiffs state law claim is properly
'recharacterized' as one arising under federal law."
Rush argues that Moran's state-law claim cannot be resolved without
interpreting plan language-specifically, the meaning of the plan exclusion
for "Services or Supplies Not Medically Necessary."
... Because Moran's state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting
a contract governed by federal law, her claim is not properly
recharacterized as an ERISA claim.
..."[S]tate law claims that are merely subject to conflict preemption
under § 514(a) are not recharacterized as claims arising under federal law"
because the federal law serves only as a defense to the state law claims.
Id. at *1-4 (quoting Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 1995)) (internal
citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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clarification of the conditions of the ERISA plan.2 8 The state
court implemented the Illinois independent review law by
requiring Rush to present Moran's claim to an independent
doctor for review.2 9
Dr. A. Lee Dellon, a reconstructive surgeon at Johns
Hopkins Medical Center, was chosen to conduct the independent
review. 30 Dr. Dellon determined that Dr. Terzis's treatment and
surgery were medically necessary under the definition of medical
necessity contained in Rush's Certificate of Group Coverage and
his own medical conclusion. 31 Rush's medical director rejected
Dellon's medical judgment that Mrs. Moran's surgery was
medically necessary and disallowed her claim for a refund in
January of 1999.32 Mrs. Moran amended her complaint in state
court to ask for repayment for the surgery as "medically
necessary" as provided in Illinois's HMO law, and Rush again
removed to federal court, contending that Moran's revised
complaint actually presented a claim for benefits provided under
ERISA that were preempted by ERISA's civil enforcement
terms. 33 The federal district court considered Moran's claim as
presenting a cause of action under ERISA and rejected her claim
because the federal district court believed ERISA preempted the
independent review provisions contained in the Illinois HMO
Act.34 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the analysis of the
28 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2157.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 2157-58.
34 Id. at 2158. The district court held that
Moran's summary judgment response first addresses this court's lack of
jurisdiction over her claims because they are state law claims not
preempted by ERISA.
... On March 22, 1999, this court denied Moran's motion to remand,
finding her claim for reimbursement preempted by ERISA's civil
enforcement policy in § 502(a). Section 502(a)(1)(B) permits a participant
or beneficiary of an ERISA plan to bring a civil action "to recover benefits
due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms
of the plan." Complete preemption under § 502(a) occurs when three
factors are present: (1) the plaintiff is eligible to bring a claim under that
section; (2) the plaintiffs state law cause of action falls within the scope of
an ERISA provision that can be enforced via § 502(a); and (3) the plaintiffs
state law claim cannot be resolved without an interpretation of a contract
[Vol.77:867
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federal district court and reversed the decision. 35 Although the
Seventh Circuit concluded that Moran's state law refund claim
was preempted by ERISA for the limited purpose of allowing the
case to remain in the federal district court, the Seventh Circuit
also rejected the district court's position that the substantive
prerequisites of Illinois's HMO Act were preempted under
ERISA.3 6 The Seventh Circuit stated that although ERISA
generally "preempts any state laws that 'relate to' employee
benefit plans" under the provisions contained in 29 U.S.C. §
1144(a), "state laws that regulat[e] insurance" are exempted
from preemption under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).37 Because the
Illinois HMO Act's independent review requirement was an
insurance regulation, it was exempted from ERISA preemption.38
The Seventh Circuit did not accept the argument that Illinois's
independent review obligation represented a prohibited
"alternative remedy" under the Supreme Court's holding in Pilot
Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux39 and highlighted the fact that
section 4-10 does not authorize any specific type of relief in state
courts as it relates to any ERISA health plan. 40 According to the
Seventh Circuit, the decision of the independent reviewer under
the Illinois HMO Act is properly implemented in a cause of
action filed under ERISA's civil enforcement system. 4' Because
governed by federal law. Whereas Moran's claim for specific performance of
the independent review itself did not require interpretation of a contract
governed by federal law, her claim for reimbursement requires an
examination of the benefits owed under her health policy plan.
Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., No. 98-C-442, 1999 WL 417384, at *2,*4
(N.D. Ill. June 15, 1999) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)).
35 See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2158 (citing Moran v. Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000)). The Seventh Circuit stated:
Illinois laws automatically are incorporated into all contracts of insurance
in that state. Thus, the provisions of § 4-10 of the HMO Act have been
incorporated into Ms. Moran's insurance contract. Therefore, the extent
and the enforceability of Ms. Moran's right to an independent review
necessarily requires an examination of the contract. Thus, Ms. Moran's
claims properly are recharacterized as claims for benefits under ERISA's
civil enforcement provision, § 502(a)(1)(B), and removal was proper.
Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959, 967 (7th Cir. 2000).
36 See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2158.
37 Id. (alteration in original).
38 Id. (citing Moran, 230 F.3d at 972 and UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v.
Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 375-76 (1999)).
39 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
40 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2158.
41 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000) and Moran, 230 F.3d at 971).
2003]
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the opinion was in disagreement with the Fifth Circuit's
handling of a comparable provision of Texas law in Corporate
Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Insurance,42 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Seventh
Circuit.43
C. Analysis of the Supreme Court's Rationale in Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran
Justice Souter, writing for the Court in Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc.,44 appeared to acknowledge that ERISA's statutory
language45 is internally contrary because the "relate to" phrase
can easily be interpreted to preempt all things related to an
employee benefit plan. On the other hand, ERISA's saving
clause appears to exempt from preemption any employee benefit
plan that is related to an insurance plan regulated by the state.
When ERISA's "relate to" language allows for an expansive use
of preemption insurance companies, HMOs are able to reject an
employee's claim for health benefits under ERISA plans without
facing any litigation accountability as defendants under state
insurance law because of an unintended use of the preemption
rationale. 46
42 Corp. Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000).
43 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2158 (citing Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 533 U.S. 948 (2001)).
44 Id. at 2156.
45 Id. at 2158 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) states that
[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under
section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1,
1975.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
46 Corporate Health Ins., Inc., 215 F.3d at 539; Weeden, supra note 9, at 231-
33. The Fifth Circuit rejected the position that the mandatory provision of the Texas
independent review law was saved from ERISA preemption under the savings
clause. One major federal goal of the savings clause is to allow the states to continue
to regulate the insurance industry under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Under the
Fifth Circuit's analysis, the Texas law providing for independent review of an
HMO's medical necessity decision is an exception to ERISA's savings clause because
otherwise saved provisions are preempted if they "conflict with a substantive
provision of ERISA." Although the Fifth Circuit appears to concede that the Texas
independent review law does not create a substantive cause of action for patients, it
unfortunately applies Pilot Life's expansive "relate to" ERISA preemptive rationale
to the procedural review issue presented in Corporate Health Ins. The Court in Pilot
Life stated "that state laws related to ERISA may also fall under the saving
ERISA EMPLO YERS THREATEN REVIEW
I agree with the observation made by one commentator that
the Supreme Court historically refused to use ERISA's saving
clause in an expansive manner to save a patient tort claim for
denial of health benefits against an HMO from being
preempted. 47 The Supreme Court in Rush Prudential HMO,
Inc. 48  used ERISA's saving clause for state insurance
regulations 49 to exclude the internal review of medical necessity
disputes between a patient's primary care physician and the
patient's HMO provider from ERISA's very destructive "relate
to" preemptive clause. ERISA's "relate to" preemptive clause
was very destructive to employee health care insurance benefits
because it simply denied an ERISA claimant an effective state
clause-was not focused on any particular relationship or conflict between a
substantive provision of ERISA and a state law." The Fifth Circuit's reliance on
Pilot Life to support an ERISA "relate to" conflict-based preemption is misplaced
because the Court in Pilot Life refused to apply ERISA's savings clause to an
employee's common law tort and contract claims because those claims simply did
not regulate insurance under Mississippi law. Id. (quoting Corp. Health Ins., Inc.,
215 F.3d at 538 and Pilot Life v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987)).
47 Commentators have similarly remarked:
Notwithstanding the savings clause, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the scope of ERISA's preemption to be quite broad. Thus, a person whose
health insurance is provided as an employee benefit, and who seeks
compensation for an improper denial of benefits, can only sue under
ERISA's civil-enforcement provision. This provision only permits a
claimant "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan." A plaintiff forced to sue under
ERISA cannot recover for consequential damages including pain, suffering,
or even death. ERISA also bars the award of punitive damages.
Wendy Silver, The Inadequacy of State Legislative Responses to ERISA Preemption
of Managed Care Liability, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 845, 853 (2003) (citation omitted).
48 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002).
49 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)-(B), (b)(4). Section 1144(b)(2)(A) states that:
"Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities." Section 1144(b)(2)(B) states in relevant
part:
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title,
which is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan
established primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any
trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance
company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or
to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance
contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). Section 1144(b)(4) states that "[slubsection (a) of this
section shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal law of a State."
2003]
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law method to hold the HMO accountable under state insurance
law. 50 I believe the "relate to" preemptive clause has been used
unfairly by HMOs to deny patients their health care insurance
benefits because their health coverage was provided by their
employer as an employee insurance benefit under ERISA. I
agree with those commentators who characterized the Supreme
Court's opinion in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. as "the most
important ERISA preemption case to ever" be decided by the
Court.51  I consider the Supreme Court's decision in Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc.5 2 as a step in the right direction because
the Court allows states to regulate HMOs under their insurance
laws when the HMO has contracted to insure that patients filing
a claim under an ERISA plan will receive needed medical
treatment. The Court in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. was
shrewd enough to tame, for now, the negative impact ERISA's
preemptive "relate[s] to" rationale has on the ability of state
insurance regulators to hold HMOs accountable for providing
covered employee patients with quality health care treatments. 53
50 Silver, supra note 47, at 854. This commentator states:
ERISA's preemption clause harms those patients who cannot hold their
MCOs fully liable for negligent actions. The harm wrought by the statute,
however, extends beyond those patients who seek tort recovery. ERISA's
preemption provision reduces MCOs' financial incentives to provide quality
care, thereby harming all MCO subscribers. Since the clause shields MCOs
from complete accountability for their actions, MCOs are left with a
relatively small financial incentive to maintain the quality of care at the
optimal level. Yet MCOs have very strong financial incentive to cut costs at
the expense of quality. This Note argues that in order to induce MCOs to
provide the optimal level of care, they need to be made subject to tort
liability to offset their incentives to eliminate costs.
Id. (citations omitted).
51 Allen D. Allred & Don L. Daniel, Upon Further Review: Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran and a New Era of Managed Care Organization Liability, 47 ST.
LOuIS U. L.J. 309, 319 (2003) ("The Rush case 'highlights the continuing struggle
courts have in defining concise and predictable boundaries as to the scope of
[ERISA] preemption of state laws,' and 'will encourage more state regulation
and... trigger lawsuits on how far states can go to protect patients from [adverse
MCO benefit decisions].' ") (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
52 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2151.
53 Id. at 2159. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated:
District courts in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have consistently
held that Pennsylvania's bad faith statute is preempted by ERISA.
However, in a very recent Eastern District opinion, the Honorable Judge
Newcomer re-examined this issue in light of a "new trend in the federal
law" established by two recent United States Supreme Court decisions,
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002) and UNUM
Life Ins. Co. of Am. v Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999). Judge Newcomer held
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The Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. Court conceded, without
meaningful debate, that section 4-10 of the Illinois HMO law
related to an employee benefit plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
because the state law obliged every insured benefit plan to
provide for review of specific benefit rejections if benefit plans
buy medical coverage from HMOs covered by the Illinois law. 54
The Supreme Court simply stated that not every state law that
relates to an employee benefit plan is preempted by ERISA55
because Congress has exempted from ERISA's preemptive grasp
employer-sponsored benefit plans that are insurance contracts. 56
that Pennsylvania's bad faith statute is not preempted by ERISA as it falls
under ERISA's savings clause.
Sprecher v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. CIV.A.02-CV-00580, 2002 WL 1917711,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2002). The court in Sprecher also stated:
In order for a state law to regulate insurance from a common-sense view of
the matter, "a law must not just have an impact on the insurance industry,
but must be specifically directed toward that industry." The plain language
of Pennsylvania's bad faith statute suggests that the state law 'regulates
insurance' because § 8371 is applicable only to insurers in actions arising
under an insurance policy. In addition, this statute is never applied outside
the insurance industry. Therefore, Pennsylvania's bad faith statute
appears to satisfy the common-sense view of a state law that regulates
insurance.
Sprecher, 2002 WL 1917711, at *4 (quoting Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct.
at 2159).
54 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2159; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
That statute provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under
section 1003(b) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
55 See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2159; see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(b) (2000). That statute states:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after
June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman
Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton
Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade
Commission Act, as amended [15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.], shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated
by State Law.
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)
56 See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2159-60; see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(A) ("Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
2003]
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In a pragmatic analysis of the dispute presented in Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc., the Supreme Court rejected Rush's one-
dimensional contention that it was not an insurer under the
Illinois HMO law because its predominant role was to serve as a
health care provider.57 The Court appropriately rejected Rush's
contention that it was not an insurer under the Illinois HMO law
by applying a common sense58 understanding of insurance law to
key aspects of its McCarran-Ferguson test.5 9  Under a
multidimensional common sense examination of the typical
agreement between an HMO and its policyholder, the agreement
contains "elements of an insurance contract"60 because the HMO
is " 'spreading and underwriting ... a policyholder's risk.'"61
The Supreme Court correctly approves of the Illinois HMO law
as regulating insurance because the law describes an HMO as an
organization that "provide[s] or arrange[s] for ... health care
plans" 62 in a scheme where the organization assumes the risk of
delivering health care to covered policyholders. 63 Rush argued
before the Supreme Court that it could not be acting as an
insurer under the ERISA saving clause because of its role as a
health care provider. 64 In response, the Supreme Court gave
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.").
57 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2160.
58 See id. at 2159 ("In Metropolitan Life, we said that in deciding whether a law
'regulates insurance' under ERISA's saving clause, we start with a 'common-sense
view of the matter,' under which 'a law must not just have an impact on the
insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that industry."
(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985) and Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987))).
59 See id. ("[I]t is generally fair to think of the combined 'common-sense' and
McCarran-Ferguson factors as parsing the 'who' and the 'what': when insurers are
regulated with respect to their insurances practices, the state law survives
ERISA.").
60 Id. (quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,
211 (1979)).
61 Id. (quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,
211 (1979)).
62 Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
63 See id.
64 Id. at 2160. The Supreme Court responded:
The answer to Rush is, of course, that an HMO is both: it provides health
care, and it does so as an insurer. Nothing in the saving clause requires an
either-or choice between health care and insurance in deciding a
preemption question, and as long as providing insurance fairly accounts for
the application of state law, the saving clause may apply. There is no
serious question about that here, for it would ignore the whole purpose of
the HMO-style of organization to conceive of HMOs (even in the traditional
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Rush and the HMO industry a reality check by advising them of
the obvious fact that they assumed the risk of losing money and
that historically Congress has viewed the HMO health care
delivery method as a structure for insurers. 65
I believe the Supreme Court's rationale in Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. that an HMO cannot avoid common sense by totally
denying its insurance obligation to its policyholders/employees 66
is helpful to state insurance regulators 67 who want to protect
their working class employees68  from HMOs that deny
sense) without their insurance element.
Id. (citations omitted). "The defining feature of an HMO is receipt of a fixed fee for
each patient enrolled under the terms of a contract to provide specified health care
if needed." Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000). The Pegram court went on
to state that "[t]he HMO thus assumes the financial risk of providing the benefits
promised: if a participant never gets sick, the HMO keeps the money regardless,
and if a participant becomes expensively ill, the HMO is responsible for the
treatment ... " Id. at 218-19.
65 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2161. Here, the Court found:
[Olne year before it passed ERISA, Congress itself defined HMOs in part
by reference to risk, set minimum standards for managing the risk, showed
awareness that States regulated HMOs as insurers, and compared HMOs
to "indemnity or service benefits insurance plans."
This conception has not changed in the intervening years. Since passage
of the federal Act, States have been adopting their own HMO enabling
Acts, and today, at least 40 of them, including Illinois, regulate HMOs
primarily through the States' insurance departments ... although they
may be treated differently from traditional insurers, owing to their
additional role as health care providers .... Finally, this view shared by
Congress and the States has passed into common understanding.
Id. (citations omitted).
66 Id. at 2162 ("Rush cannot checkmate common sense by trying to submerge
HMOs' insurance features beneath an exclusive characterization of HMOs as
providers of health care.").
67 See David M. Humiston et al., Navigating the Shoals of ERISA: The Effect of
ERISA Preemption on New State Laws Creating Tort Liability Against Managed
Care Entities, 14 HEALTH LAW. 1, 1 (2002). The authors discussed:
Several states have recently enacted health care liability laws establishing
statutory causes of action against health care service plans and managed
care entities. These statutes employ various approaches and utilize
differing language in an effort to avoid Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") preemption of state laws relating to
employee benefit plans.
Id. (internal citations omitted). "State statutes imposing liability on health service
plans and managed care entities, for either failing to arrange for medically
necessary health care services or failing to exercise ordinary care in making health
care treatment decisions, walk a fine line along the boundaries of ERISA
preemption." Id. at 3.
68 See L. Darnell Weeden, An HMO Does Not Owe an ERISA Fiduciary Duty to
Its Employee Beneficiaries: After Pegram v. Herdrich, Who Will Speak for the
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policyholders a meaningful opportunity to challenge a broad
range of issues related to the quality of healthcare provided. 69
Although Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. is accommodating to state
insurance regulators wanting to provide additional rights to
patients seeking healthcare from an HMO under an ERISA plan,
the decision raises new issues about whether a state as an
insurance regulator may provide traditional judicial remedies to
patients who have received negligent or inadequate medical care
from the HMO where the HMO's profit motive as an insurer is
the proximate cause of the HMO's negligent behavior as a health
care provider.7 0 Some commentators argue that the holding of
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. generally prohibits states from
expanding patients' judicial rights in the name of insurance
regulations because to do so would defy ERISA's preemptive
rationale by providing a patient with an independent alternative
Working Class?, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 381, 407 (2002) ("The Supreme Court
should hold that HMOs might be held liable for any conduct that unreasonably
interferes with the provision of medical services to an ERISA beneficiary because
Congress did not intend to deny state law tort remedies to employees needing
medical services.").
69 Cf. Humiston et al., supra note 67, at 6-7. The authors found:
The Supreme Court's ruling in Rush Prudential did not address the
quality/quantity distinction because this issue was not central to the
review law conflict that resulted in the court considering this case.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Rush Prudential is
consistent with the quality/quantity distinction because the court
determined that the plaintiffs claims amounted to a basic coverage dispute
and that the state independent physician review law was subsumed into
the ERISA plan by operation of law. Therefore, in the wake of Rush
Prudential, the quality/quantity distinction continues to remain a viable
tool for the evaluation of state laws that attempt to encroach on the
exclusivity of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme for the foreseeable future.
Id.
70 See Gregory Pimstone & Michele Johnson, Rush Prudential: Savior of Pilot
Life?, 15 HEALTH LAW. 7, 8 (2002). Pimstone and Johnson discussed the Supreme
Court's finding in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.:
While the primary focus in Rush Prudential was the Court's controversial
finding that the state-law provision at issue-a provision of the Illinois
HMO Act mandating an independent medical review that is binding on the
HMO-did not constitute a state law enforcement mechanism alternative
to ERISA, the Court quietly dispensed with the notion that Pilot Life was
dead. Even while it upheld the state provision at issue, the Court
confirmed that state bad-faith law, as well as other state laws that seek to
create judicial remedies outside those provided under ERISA, remain
preempted under Pilot Life-even when they are aimed directly at HMOs
or insurers.
Id. at8.
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remedy in violation of the exclusive remedy requirements of Pilot
Life. 71  Miles J. Zaremski correctly suggests that the Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. and Pegram v. Herdrich rationales allow a
state to expand a patient's rights against an HMO because states
traditionally regulate insurance and the quality of treatment
patients receive from healthcare providers.7 2
71 See id. The authors, Pimstone and Johnson, argued:
The Court repeatedly cited to the bad-faith claim in Pilot Life as an
example of state law that impermissibly invaded ERISA's civil
enforcement scheme and, as if to underscore its point, observed that even if
the state-law claims in Pilot Life "could have been characterized as the
products of 'insurance regulation', they nonetheless would have
significantly expanded the potential scope of ultimate liability imposed on
employers by the ERISA scheme." A state law "that provided a form of
ultimate relief in a judicial forum that added to the judicial remedies
provided by ERISA," declared the Rush Court, would "patently violateD"
ERISA's policies and is preempted. The Supreme Court in Rush
underscored the "overpowering federal policy of exclusivity in ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions."
Id. (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 41-42 (1987)).
72 See Miles J. Zaremski, HMOs Accountability, and the Death of ERISA
Preemption, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 553-54 (2002) (citing RushPrudential HMO,
Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002) and Pegram v. Herdich, 120 S. Ct. 2143
(2000)). Zaremski was correct when he wrote:
Two final comments here. First, some observers would say the Supreme
Court, in Rush Prudential, has announced that damages, in whatever
context they are raised, are limited to the cost of the benefit denied when a
beneficiary disputes a decision of a plan based upon denial of care, in turn
based upon whether that care is medically necessary. After all, we now
know, these observers would further say that this type damage, once only
enforceable in an action brought under ERISA's civil enforcement scheme,
still can be pursued only in federal court under ERISA with the same
damage cap. This is making pronouncements with blinders affixed.
The Rush Prudential decision is a benefits case; it is that simple. When a
beneficiary of a plan wants his or her treatment covered, without claiming
any further damages, then the relief now could arguably be found under
state law in a state court providing for independent reviews of health plan
decisions premised on medical necessity. That is, what the Court arguably
does, in a practical sense, is perhaps suggest a shifting of forums for
resolution of a benefits claim involving an independent reviewer's
determination from federal court under ERISA to state court for violation
of an independent reviewer statute (again, should the reviewer decide
against the HMO and the HMO does not wish to follow the decision of the
independent reviewer). Others, perhaps, would differ here, opining that,
where federal courts have, at a minimum, concurrent jurisdiction with
state courts, the ultimate arbiter for benefits even based upon a state
statute that has been violated remains federal court under ERISA.
Nonetheless, a beneficiary knows that, regardless of the forum used, an
independent review provided by state statute cannot be preempted by
ERISA, and that deference will not be given to how plan documents define
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In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. the Supreme Court stated
that under ERISA law, the civil enforcement provisions of 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a) 73 may demonstrate a congressional intent that
supersedes a federal law aimed at preventing state insurance
law from being preempted. 74 According to the Supreme Court, a
state law necessarily conflicts with the enforcement provisions of
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) by making available a forbidden "form of
ultimate relief in a judicial forum that added to the judicial
remedies provided by ERISA."75 In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.,
the state regulatory system did not violate the enforcement
provisions because it did not create a "new cause of action under
state law," and thus section 4-10 did not allow a new type of
eventual remedy.76 Although independent review under section
4-10 could resolve the status of a benefit claim involving a
specific insurance contract, the Illinois law does not expand the
claim outside of the benefits presented in a lawsuit filed under
section 1132(a).7 7 Even if the reviewer's judgment is substituted
for the HMO's concerning what is "medically necessary" under
the insurance contract, the remedy ultimately available is
permitted by ERISA in a federal court case claiming benefits
under section 1132(a). 78 The Illinois HMO law section 4-10 is
"medical necessity." In possibly allowing for this, the Court affirms the
precept that the area of health law is traditionally venued within the
states.
Id. (citations omitted).
73 See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 2164 n.7 (2002)
("Title 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) provides in relevant part: A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of
this section ... or (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan ... ").
74 The Supreme Court has held that "the civil enforcement provisions are of
such extraordinarily preemptive power that they override even the 'well-pleaded
complaint' rule for establishing the conditions under which a cause of action may be
removed to a federal forum." Id. at 2165 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481
U.S. 59, 63-64 (1987)). The Court noted in Metropolitan Life "that Congress had so
completely preempted the field of benefits law that an ostensibly state cause of
action for benefits was necessarily a 'creature of federal law' removable to federal
court." Id. at 2166 (citations omitted).
75 Id. at 2166.
76 Id. at 2167.
77 Id.
78 Id. The Court wrote:
This case therefore does not involve the sort of additional claim or remedy
exemplified in Pilot Life, Russell, and Ingersoll-Rand, but instead bears a
resemblance to the claims-procedure rule that we sustained in UNUM Life
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reasonably accommodated by the federal civil enforcement
provisions contained in § 1132(a) because reviewing insurance
decisions about what is "medically necessary" is likely
inseparable from enforcing indispensable state-law regulations
which ensure reasonable medical care. 79 In affirming the lower
court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that because Illinois
law provides the right to review medical necessity disputes
between the claimant and the HMO, the civil enforcement goals
of section 1132(a), ERISA's saving clause, were not undercut.
The Court further stated that because section 1132(a) was
applicable, it followed that section 4-10 of the Illinois HMO law
was valid.80
II. A STATE'S "MEDICAL NECESSITY" REVIEW
INSURANCE REGULATION MUST BE PROTECTED
FROM ILLUSORY ERISA SELF-FUNDED BENEFIT PLANS
One reviewer of leading cases states that the Court's opinion
in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. will clearly encourage states to
expand their regulation of HMOs, thereby increasing regulation
costs.8 1 This view is contrasted by the argument that Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. was a mixed blessing for state insurance
regulators wanting to invoke more costly regulations to protect a
Ins. Co. of America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999), holding that a state law
barring enforcement of a policy's time limitation on submitting claims did
not conflict with § 1132(a), even though the state "rule of decision," could
mean the difference between success and failure for a beneficiary. The
procedure provided by § 4-10 does not fall within Pilot Life's categorical
preemption.
Id. (citations omitted).
79 See id. at 2171.
80 See id.
81 Leading Cases, Federal Statutes and Regulations Preemption, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 412, 421 (2002).
This expanded definition of insurance regulation has an important,
concrete result: substantive regulation of the contractual relationship
between HMOs and their providers-the mechanism HMOs use to control
costs-now likely qualifies as insurance regulation under ERISA's savings
clause. For instance, "any willing provider" (AWP) state statutes, which
require an HMO to contract with any provider that agrees to comply with
the HMO's terms, are probably insurance regulations not preempted by
ERISA-an issue that had split the circuits before Moran and on which the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari for argument this Term.
Id. at 417-18. In Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1479
(2003), the Supreme Court held that Kentucky's AWP statutes were valid insurance
regulations and were not preempted by ERISA.
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patient's right to adequate medical treatment without any undue
interference from the HMO.8 2  Nevertheless, if the Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. decision's regulatory power increases costs
to employers, this may lead some employers to change to
unfunded employee benefit plans to avoid ERISA's insurance
saving clause.8 3 An employer may be motivated to change
"because the insurance savings clause applies only to 'funded,' or
'insured,' employee welfare benefit plans. '8 4 The Court observed
in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. that "ERISA's 'deemer' clause
provides an exception to its saving clause that forbids States
from regulating self-funded plans as insurers. '8 5
In my opinion an allegedly self-funded ERISA employer who
purchases any amount of reinsurance to mitigate its healthcare
losses runs the risk of being converted into an insurer under the
ERISA saving clause. I believe an ERISA employer should not
be allowed to take advantage of ERISA's deemer clause for self-
funded healthcare plans when there is objective evidence that
the employer is self-funded in name only because the employer
has actually purchased reinsurance to cover its healthcare
liabilities.
Funded benefit plans pay for promised health care
benefits by contracting with a health insurer-for
example, a fee-for-service provider such as Blue-
Cross/Blue-Shield, or a managed care organization, such
as an HMO ... to pay the benefits. In a self-funded plan,
the employer itself pays the promised benefits.8 6
When an ERISA self-funded plan8 7 breaches its promise to
pay an employee from its own funds by seeking reinsurance to
82 See Leading Cases, supra note 81, at 421.
83 Id.
84 Id. This commentator remarked:
Thus, the Court's decision may actually decrease the number of employee
benefit plans subject to state health regulation. Unfunded plans are only
lightly regulated because of ERISA's broad preemptive reach and
corresponding lack of substantive health plan regulation. And employers
can mitigate the financial risks of offering unfunded employee benefit
plans by either purchasing reinsurance and contracting with insurance
companies to perform the administrative tasks or, for large employers, by
spreading risk among their own employees.
Id. (citations omitted)
85 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2162 n.6 (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(B) and FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990)).
86 Leading Cases, supra note 81, at 421.
87 See id. at 421 n.59. "These labels are imprecise because self-funded/insured
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mitigate against any losses incurred by a self-funded promise to
pay, that breach should disqualify the pretextual self-funded
employer from ERISA's deemer clause. I think when an
allegedly self-funded insurance plan under ERISA functions as a
well-designed, de facto stop loss insurance plan, ERISA's savings
clause and not its deemer clause should apply. The Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. Court found that "primary insurers...
usually purchase insurance to cover a portion of the risk they
assume from the consumer."88  When a pretextual self-funded
ERISA employer functions like a primary insurer in covering its
employees' healthcare benefits by purchasing insurance to cover
its ERISA plan's risk of loss, it should no longer be deemed a
self-funded ERISA employer under ERISA's deemer clause.8 9
Congress intended that HMOs be risk-bearing organizations
controlled by state insurance law. Therefore, a state law that
"defines HMOs by reference to risk-bearing ... is a law 'directed
toward' the insurance industry ... under a 'commonsense' view"
and the McCarran-Ferguson factors.90  In Pilot Life v. Dedeaux
the Court identified three factors to consider in deciding whether
the ERISA savings clause applies to a specific practice in the
"'business of insurance' for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act."91 Under the first factor, a court must determine "whether
the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a
plans always fund benefits, and indeed may do so via purchasing reinsurance. Also,
even self-insured plans are functional insurers, as they spread the cost of paying for
health care among the employees." Id.
88 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2162 (quoting Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772-73 (1993)).
89 See id. at 2162 n.6.
90 Id. at 2163. The Supreme Court has stated:
[In deciding whether a law "regulates insurance" under ERISA's saving
clause, we start with a "common- sense view of the matter," under which "a
law must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be
specifically directed toward that industry." We then test the results of the
common-sense enquiry by employing the three factors used to point to
insurance laws spared from federal preemption under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. Although this is not the place to plot the exact perimeter of
the saving clause, it is generally fair to think of the combined "common-
sense" and McCarran-Ferguson factors as parsing the "who" and the
"what": when insurers are regulated with respect to their insurance
practices, the state law survives ERISA.
Id. at 2159 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 742-44
(1985) and Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987)).
91 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987) (citing Union Labor Life
Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)).
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policyholder's risk."92  The second factor requires a court to
decide "whether the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured."93 Lastly, the
third factor explores "whether the practice is limited to entities
within the insurance industry."94 Writing for the Court, Justice
Souter stated that application of the second and third McCarran-
Ferguson factors 95 supported the Court's application of the
savings clause because the independent review obligation under
the Illinois HMO law "regulates 'an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insured'"96 and because the Illinois law
"regulates [the] application of HMO contracts ' 97 by granting the
insured a review of a rejected claim.98
The Supreme Court in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. correctly
rejected Rush's contention that an HMO ceases to be an insurer
when it puts together a strategy to limit or eliminate the level of
its exposure to potential risk by contracting with third-party
insurers.9 9 I take the position that an ERISA employer who
alleges that it operates a self-funded plan'but designs a scheme
to contract with a third-party insurer to limit or eliminate the
exposure of its self-funded plan has only created an illusory self-
funded plan. I define illusory ERISA self-funded plans as those
plans where the alleged self-funded ERISA plans have actually
92 Id.
93 Id. at 48-49.
94 Id. at 49.
95 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2163. Here, the court stated:
Because the factors are guideposts, a state law is not required to satisfy all
three McCarran-Ferguson criteria to survive preemption and so we follow
our precedent and leave open whether the review mandated here may be
described as going to a practice that "spread[s] a policyholder's risk." For in
any event, the second and third factors are clearly satisfied by § 4-10.
Id. (citations omitted).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 2164.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 2162. The Court further explained:
These arguments, however, are built on unsound assumptions. Rush's first
contention assumes that an HMO is no longer an insurer when it arranges
to limit its exposure, as when an HMO arranges for capitated contracts to
compensate its affiliated physicians with a set fee for each HMO patient
regardless of the treatment provided. Under such an arrangement, Rush
claims, the risk is not borne by the HMO at all. In a similar vein, Rush
points out that HMOs may contract with third-party insurers to protect
themselves against large claims.
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assigned either all or some of the risk of providing an employee
healthcare benefit to a third party. In my opinion, under the
Court's rationale in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., nothing
prohibits "applying the saving clause" to an illusory self-funded
ERISA plan where the employer has actually prearranged for
any part of the risk of providing the healthcare benefit to its
employees to a third party. 100 The Court suggested that the
saving clause may apply to a state law description of an HMO
that includes a contractor that only provided administrative
services for a self-funded plan. 101 The Court's suggestion lends
support to my theory that an insurer or HMO that provides any
risk of loss to an illusory self-funded plan establishes that the
risk spreading self-funded plan is not entitled to be exempted
from insurance regulations under ERISA's deemer clause. 10 2
The mere possibility of some overbreadth in the application of
ERISA's deemer clause to an illusory self-insured fund that has
actually purchased insurance to cover its risks of health benefits
to its employees fails to demonstrate that Congress intended
such an incidental "application to noninsurers to remove a state
law entirely from the category of insurance regulation saved
from preemption." 103
The federal statutory deemer clause was intended to focus
directly upon the specific practice of excluding a self-funded plan
from being regulated as insurance by state law because under a
true self-funded plan there is no "relation of insured to
insurer"10 4 to impact, as the uninsured self-funded plan assumes,
all the risks of providing ERISA benefits. 105 When the illusory
self-funded plan attains insurance coverage to protect itself
against potential losses, it "also affects the relation of insured to
insurer and the spreading of risk-matters that [the] Court, in
other contexts, has placed at the core of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act's"106anti-preemption savings clause rationale. One
100 Id.
101 See id. ("Nor do we see anything standing in the way of applying the saving
clause if we assume that the general state definition of HMO would include a
contractor that provides only administrative services for a self-funded plan.").
102 See id.
103 See id. at 2163.
104 Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 39 (1996)
(citations omitted).
105 Id.
106 Id.
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commentator has accurately described alleged self-funded plans
as "functional insurers."10 7  I believe that when illusory self-
funded plans actually function as insurers, they lose the right to
assert deemer clause preemption because Congress did not
intend for an illusory self-funded plan to take advantage of a
deemer clause designed to protect the true self-funded plan from
state insurance regulation.108 In FMC Corporation v. Holliday,
the Court decided that ERISA preempted a Pennsylvania law
prohibiting employee welfare benefit plans from implementing
subrogation rights involving a tort claim. 10 9 Justice O'Connor,
speaking for the Court, stated that "[t]he Plan is self-funded; it
does not purchase an insurance policy from any insurance
company in order to satisfy its obligations to its participants."110
I believe the logical deduction from Justice O'Connor's statement
is that an illusory self-funded plan that purchases an insurance
policy to cover its obligations to plan participants ceases to be a
self-funded plan under ERISA's deemer clause and is not
entitled to preemption.' An employer who claims that his plan
is a self-funded plan but actually purchases insurance to cover
his potential ERISA plan benefit losses should be "subject to
indirect state insurance regulation"" 2 that normally applies to
insured plans. The real issue is whether Congress intended to
allow a pretextual self-funded plan that actually purchases
insurance to mitigate against ERISA's healthcare benefit claims
to invoke preemption under a deemer clause intended for de
facto self-funded plans. 1 3 I think Congress did not intend to
107 See Leading Cases, supra note 81, at 421 n.59.
108 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2162 n.6 (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000) and FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990)).
109 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 65 (1990).
110 Id. at 54.
111 Id. The Court stated:
An insurance company that insures a plan remains an insurer for purposes
of state laws "purporting to regulate insurance" after application of the
deemer clause. The insurance company is therefore not relieved from state
insurance regulation. The ERISA plan is consequently bound by state
insurance regulations insofar as they apply to the plan's insurer.
Id. at 61.
112 Id.
113 Id. Justice O'Connor reasoned:
We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state
laws that "regulat[e] insurance" within the meaning of the saving
clause.... [S]elf-funded ERISA plans are exempt from state regulation
insofar as that regulation "relate[s] to" the plans. State laws directed
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permit self-funded ERISA benefit plans that fail the self-funded
duck test because the employer actually purchased insurance to
cover its ERISA benefit losses to invoke preemption under
ERISA's deemer clause. 114 I take the position that once the
employer of an historically self-funded plan purchases stop-loss
insurance to cover its ERISA benefits for employees, it should be
considered as an insured plan because the state may engage in
the "regulation of the substantive terms of insurance
contracts"115 under the rationale of ERISA's saving clause.
In a dissenting opinion in FMC Corporation, Justice Stevens
properly asserted that "[firom the standpoint of the beneficiaries
of ERISA plans-who after all are the primary beneficiaries of
the entire statutory program-there is no apparent reason for
treating self-insured plans differently from insured plans. 116
There is no perceivable basis for a court to believe that Congress
rationally intended that an illusory self-insurance plan where
the employer actually buys insurance to diminish future ERISA
health benefit losses could escape the reach of the saving
clause. 11 7 I agree with Justice Stevens's inference that a narrow
toward the plans are pre-empted because they relate to an employee
benefit plan but are not "saved" because they do not regulate insurance.
State laws that directly regulate insurance are "saved" but do not reach
self-funded employee benefit plans because the plans may not be deemed
to be insurance companies, other insurers, or engaged in the business of
insurance for purposes of such state laws.
Id.
114 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000).
115 See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 62 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U.S. 724, 742-44 (1985)).
116 Id. at 66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Why should a self-insured plan have a right to enforce a subrogation
clause against an injured employee while an insured plan may not? The
notion that this disparate treatment of similarly situated beneficiaries is
somehow supported by an interest in uniformity is singularly
unpersuasive. If Congress had intended such an irrational result, surely it
would have expressed it in straightforward English. At least one would
expect that the reasons for drawing such an apparently irrational
distinction would be discernible in the legislative history or in the
literature discussing the legislation.
The Court's anomalous result would be avoided by a correct and
narrower reading of either the basic pre-emption clause or the deemer
clause.
The Court has endorsed an unnecessarily broad reading of the words
"relate to any employee benefit plan" as they are used in the basic pre-
emption clause of § 514(a).
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and plain reading of the deemer clause leads to the
unremarkable conclusion that the clause prohibits a state from
regulating contracts by deeming a self-funded uninsured ERISA
plan without the benefit of stop-loss coverage to be an insurance
entity.118 It is true that a self-funded uninsured ERISA plan is
not deemed to be subject to state insurance regulations. 119 It is
also equally true that the deemer clause does not address a
situation of whether the employer sponsor of an illusory self-
funded plan that actually secures an insurance contract to cover
its potential ERISA plan benefits liability must comply with an
insurance law granting a patient a right to review certain
medical necessity decisions. 120 In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., I
believe the Court narrowed the reach of ERISA's "relate to"
phrase while saving a state law granting a patient's right of
external review on the issue of medical necessity from
preemption.1 21 Even under a generous construction of the "relate
to" phrase in ERISA's central pre-emption clause, the response
to the query of whether an illusory self-funded plan covered
against ERISA benefit losses by an employer's insurance policy
"must comply with state laws regulating" insurance contracts
"depends on the scope of the saving clause."1 22 According to
Justice Stevens, the class of state laws depicted in the saving
clause is more expansive than the type of laws explained within
the deemer clause. 123 Justice Stevens also stated:
While the saving clause thus exempts from the pre-
emption clause all state laws that have the broad effect of
regulating insurance, the deemer clause simply allows
pre-emption of those state laws that expressly regulate
insurance and that would therefore be applicable to
ERISA plans only if States were allowed to deem such
plans to be insurance companies. 24
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118 See id. at 70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121 See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct., 2151, 2170-71 (2002).
122 FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 71 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000)). Section 1144(b)(2)(A) provides: "Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or
relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities."
123 FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In my opinion, a state law mandating HMOs to grant an
independent review of medical necessity disputes under an
ERISA plan "fits into the broader category of state laws that fall
within the saving clause"125 if an employer for an alleged self-
funded plan actually purchases an insurance contract to cover
any self-funded plan welfare benefit losses. 126
III. THE RATIONALE OF KENTUCKYASS'N OF HEALTH PLANS V.
MILLER ALLOWS A STATE TO USE MEDICAL NECESSITY REVIEW
INSURANCE REGULATIONS TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON THE RIGHT
TO INSURE ERISA SELF-FUNDED BENEFIT PLANS WITH STOP-
LOSS COVERAGE
Unlike some commentators, 127 I believe ERISA's anti-
preemption saving clause should apply whenever an employer
buys a stop-loss 128 insurance policy to limit the employer's
125 Id. at 72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). On this point, Justice Stevens stated:
Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law fits into the
broader category of state laws that fall within the saving clause only. The
Act regulates persons in addition to insurance companies and affects
subrogation and indemnity agreements that are not necessarily insurance
contracts. Yet because it most assuredly is not a law "purporting" to
regulate any of the entities described in the deemer clause--"insurance
companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies," the deemer clause does not by its plain language apply to this
state law. Thus, although the Pennsylvania law is exempted from ERISA's
pre- emption provision by the broad saving clause because it "regulates
insurance," it is not brought back within the scope of ERISA pre-emption
by operation of the narrower deemer clause. I therefore would conclude
that petitioner is subject to Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Law.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127 See, e.g., Diane Kutzko et al., HIPAA in Real Time: Practical Implications of
the Federal Privacy Rule, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 403, 445 (2003) (asserting that as long
as stop loss coverage is a part of a plan obligation, it is preempted by ERISA).
128 See id. at 445-46 (describing how stop loss coverage may invoke ERISA
preemption).
Typically, employers that sponsor self-insured plans will obtain insurance
from an insurance company so as to provide coverage to the employer in
the event claims under such a self-insured plan exceed a certain dollar
amount during the course of the plan year. Stop loss insurance is usually
designed to pay if claims reach a specific (claims over a certain dollar
amount per participant per plan year) and an aggregate (a total amount of
plan claims per plan year). Stop loss coverage is designed to protect the
employer-and the plan-from catastrophic claims in any given plan year.
Id. at 445 n.255 (citing CCH Benefits Law Analysts, CCH, Inc., Employee Benefits
Management 10,355 (2002)).
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financial liability to claims in a plan year. I maintain that it is
an illogical verbal contradiction to allow an employer to buy stop
loss insurance "to cover the risks associated with its self-funding
of the plan"'129 while simultaneously claiming to be a self-funded
employer sponsor of an ERISA benefit plan. Commentators
recognize that self-funded employers travel on a slippery slope
by purchasing stop-loss insurance to cover the risks of an alleged
self-funded plan.' 30 In order to avoid both ERISA's saving clause
and the burden of state insurance regulations and to preserve
preemption, a self-funded employer, who purchases insurance to
cover plan risks, should carefully create the legal fiction that
stop-loss coverage is not a responsibility of the plan "[blecause
this insurance is typically obtained by the employer to cover the
risks associated with its self-funding of the plan, and not regular
claims." 31
Recently, in Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller,13 2 the
Supreme Court clearly expanded the regulatory reach of state
insurance laws and narrowed ERISA's preemptive reach by
applying the savings clause to a state law regulating self-
insured, non-ERISA plans and "entities outside the insurance
industry, such as health-care providers." 133 In Kentucky Ass'n of
Health Plans, Kentucky's "Any Willing Provider" (AWP) law was
challenged in a suit by a number of HMOs as preempted by
ERISA. 134 Kentucky's AWP laws harmed the HMOs' capacity to
control the quantity of providers with the right to use to their
networks, and consequently their capacity to utilize the
assertion of a large number of patients as a quid pro quo for the
129 Id. at 445.
130 See id. at 445-46 ( varning that extra care should be given in setting up
stop-loss coverage to avoid preemption issues).
131 Id. at 445.
132 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003).
133 Id. at 1475.
134 Id. at 1474. The Kentucky law declares that "[a] health insurer shall not
discriminate against any provider who is located within the geographic coverage
area of the health benefit plan and who is willing to meet the terms and conditions
for participation established by the health insurer, including the Kentucky state
Medicaid program and Medicaid partnerships." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-270
(Michie 2001). Moreover, any "health benefit plan that includes chiropractic benefits
shall ... [p]ermit any licensed chiropractor who agrees to abide by the terms,
conditions, reimbursement rates, and standards of quality of the health benefit plan
to serve as a participating primary chiropractic provider to any person covered by
the plan." Id. § 304.17A-171(2).
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lower prices charged by members of the network. 135 The HMOs
assumed that the AWP laws would negatively impact their
attempts to have power over cost and quality and would
eventually prohibit consumers from receiving the benefit of
HMOs' cost-saving measures with network providers. 136 The
federal district court held that although Kentucky's AWP laws
"relate to" an employee benefit plan within the meaning of 29
U.S.C § 1144(a), each law "regulates insurance" and is saved
from preemption under section 1144(b)(2)(A). 137 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's
decision.'38 The Sixth Circuit held that Kentucky's AWP laws
"regulate insurance 'as a matter of common sense,' because they
are 'specifically directed toward insurers and the insurance
industry.' '"139 After concluding that Kentucky's AWP laws
regulate insurance both under the common sense assessment
and the three McCarran-Ferguson factors,140 the Sixth Circuit
agreed with the district court's conclusion that the AWP laws
were not preempted.
The Supreme Court specifically rejected the appellant
HMO's contention that the state's AWP laws failed the "not
specifically directed toward" insurance requirement for
regulating insurance because the AWP law applied to self-
insurer arrangement not saved from preemption by ERISA's
savings clause.14' "We do not think § 304.17A-270's application
to self-insured non-ERISA plans forfeits its status as a 'law...
which regulates insurance' under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)."'142
135 Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 123 S. Ct. at 1474.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. (citing Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352, 363-72
(6th Cir. 2000)).
139 Id. (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit relied on UNUM Life Ins. Co. of
America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999), for its common sense analysis of whether
Kentucky's AWP law regulates insurance. Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 123 S.
Ct. at 1474.
140 Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 123 S. Ct. at 1474-75.
These factors are: "first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring
or spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the
insurance industry." The Sixth Circuit found all three factors satisfied.
Id. at 1474 (citations omitted).
141 Id. at 1476 n.1.
142 Id.
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In my opinion the Court's rationale in Kentucky Ass'n of Health
Plans lends itself to the strong argument that ERISA's savings
clause for insurance regulations should apply to the ERISA self-
insured plans as well as non-ERISA "self-insured plans [that]
engage in the same sort of risk pooling arrangements as separate
entities that provide insurance to an employee benefit plan."143
The Court stated that ERISA's savings clause should
characterize state insurance laws by what they actually
regulate. 144 A state law regulates insurance if it requires certain
conditions to be met in order to engage in the business of
insurance when those conditions substantially affect the method
of assigning risks. 145 Under the rationale of Kentucky Ass'n of
Health Plans146 and Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.,1 47 a state may
require those attempting to provide insurance, or its functional
equivalent, to cover any of the risks of an illusory self-funded
ERISA employee benefit health plan to provide the illusory self-
funded plan with a reinsurance contract that allows for
independent review in a dispute involving the question of
medical necessity. 148 A state law requiring an insurer to provide
for medical necessity reviews in its insurance contracts with self-
funded employers seeking to cover its risks of loss under an
ERISA employee benefit plan clearly "affect[s] the risk pooling
arrangement" between the insurer and the illusory self-funded
plan that actually purchases the insurance. 149
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1476-77.
145 Id. at 1477. The Court stated:
We emphasize that conditions on the right to engage in the business of
insurance must also substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement
between the insurer and the insured to be covered by ERISA's savings
clause. Otherwise, any state law aimed at insurance companies could be
deemed a law that "regulates insurance," contrary to our interpretation of
§ 1144(b)(2)(A) in Rush Prudential. A state law requiring all insurance
companies to pay their janitors twice the minimum wage would not
"regulate insurance," even though it would be a prerequisite to engaging in
the business of insurance, because it does not substantially affect the risk
pooling arrangement undertaken by insurer and insured.
Id.
146 See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
147 See supra Part I.C.
.148 See Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 123 S. Ct. at 1477 (holding that state
laws which "substantially affect to risk pool arrangement between insurer and
insured" may be considered regulating insurance).
149 Id.
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By shifting its potential ERISA health plan benefits losses
from itself to an insurer, the operator of a self-funded employee
plan has unilaterally affected risk pooling arrangements
between the insured employer risk and the self-funded ERISA
plan. 150 I believe the self-funded plan ceases to be a functional
self-funded ERISA plan once an employer purchases insurance
to cover the risk of a self-funded ERISA plan's employee benefits
losses. It is my position that once an employer purchases stop-
loss insurance to cover the risk of a self-funded ERISA plan, a
state may require an insurer to include "the independent-review
provisions [the Court] approved in Rush Prudential."151 In
Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, the Court made it clear that
ERISA's savings clause requires "that the state law substantially
affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and
insured; it does not require that the state law actually spread
risk."' 52 A state law requiring an insurer that provides risk
coverage to an employer operating a self-funded plan to grant
review in a medical necessity dispute governs whether an
insurance company must grant review in medical necessity
disputes, "which dictates to the insurance company the
conditions under which it must pay for the risk that it has
assumed"153 in providing coverage for an employer operating a
self-funded plan. In my opinion a state law granting medical
necessity review under the circumstances of a stop-loss purchase
"qualifies as a substantial effect on the risk of pooling
arrangement between the insurer"15 4 and the stop-loss insured
employer sponsor of a self-funded ERISA plan.
In Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, the Supreme Court
stated that its historical use of the three factor McCarran-
Ferguson test in the specific context of the ERISA saving clause
analysis had been "misdirected" while contributing very little to
a relevant legal analysis. 155 The Court announced it would
"make a clean break from the McCarran-Ferguson factors" in
deciding whether a state law regulates insurance under ERISA's
savings clause. 156 For purposes of ERISA's saving clause, a state
150 Id. at 1477-78.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1477 n.3.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1478.
156 Id. at 1479 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000)). 29 U.S.C.
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law regulates insurance if it is "specifically directed toward
entities engaged in insurance" and the law "must substantially
affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the
insured."157  I believe a state law directing entities providing
stop-loss insurance to employers to cover the health benefit risks
of the employers' self-funded ERISA plan, like the Kentucky law
in Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, satisfies each of these
requirements. 158
In Bill Gray Enterprises v. Gourley,159 the Court of Appeals
for the Thrid Circuit addressed the issue of whether a self-
funded employee benefit plan that buys stop-loss insurance from
a third-party insurer is subject to Pennsylvania laws regulating
anti-subrogation clauses in insurance contracts.1 60 The court
held that a self-funded employee benefit plan containing a stop-
loss insurance provision is not deemed an insurance provider
under ERISA. 16' According to the Third Circuit, the plan was
not subject to state laws regulating insurance contracts because
the self-funded plan does not provide insurance. 162 Under the
rationale of the Supreme Court in Kentucky Ass'n of Health
Plans, if a state insurance regulation requires that an insurer
selling stop-loss insurance covering health benefit claims to
contain a provision allowing for independent review in medical
necessity claim disputes, the law should be treated as valid
under ERISA's savings clause because it is directed at the risk
pooling arrangement between the insured plan and the
insurer.' 63 In my opinion, the holding of Bill Gray Enterprises
should not apply to those situations where the state insurance
regulation is aimed at the risk pooling arrangement between the
stop-loss insured and the insurer providing the stop-gap
§ 1144(b)(2)(A) states that "Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any
State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."
167 Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 123 S. Ct. at 1479.
158 See id. at 1479.
169 248 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2001).
160 Id. at 209.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 214.
163 Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 123 S. Ct. at 1478-79 ("It is obvious enough
that the independent review requirement regulates an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and insured." (quoting Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.
v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 2163 (2002))).
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insurance because the law only incidentally impacts 164 a self-
funded plan electing to purchase stop-gap insurance for its
otherwise self-funded plan.1 65 . Prior to the Supreme Court
adopting a new test for what constitutes insurance regulation for
ERISA's saving clause analysis in Kentucky Ass'n of Health
Plans, the Third Circuit reasoned that "[b]ecause stop-loss
insurance is designed to protect self-funded employee benefit
plans, rather than individual participants, plans purchasing
stop-loss insurance are not deemed 'insured' under ERISA."'166
Unlike the court in Bill Gray Enterprises, I believe that it
challenges our common sense understanding of the English
language to pretend that an ERISA plan with stop-gap insurance
is to be deemed an uninsured plan for purposes of ERISA's
deemer clause. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a), the Supreme Court
has "identified laws governing the 'business of insurance' in the
Act to include not only direct regulation of the insurer but also
164 See Lincoln Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lectron Prod., Inc., 970 F.2d 206, 210 (6th Cir.
1992) ("In other words, the deemer clause relieves ERISA benefit plans-both
uninsured and insured plans-from direct state regulation, but, because the clause
does not relieve a plan's insurer, state regulation may have an incidental, or
'indirect,' effect on ERISA plans.").
165 See Bill Gray Enterprises, 248 F.3d at 215, for a counter viewpoint. The
Third Circuit, however, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kentucky Ass'n of
Health Plans, expressed the view that
[m]erely by purchasing stop-loss insurance and at the same time retaining
financial responsibility for plan participants' coverage, self-funded plans
may not rely on the assets of an insurance company in the event of
insolvency. It follows that reimbursement and subrogation rights are vital
to ensuring the financial stability of self-funded plans. Consistent with
other courts of appeals, therefore, we hold that when an ERISA plan
purchases stop-loss insurance but does not otherwise delegate its financial
responsibilities to another third party insurer, it remains an uninsured
self-funded welfare plan for ERISA preemption purposes. Because stop-
loss insurance is designed to protect self-funded employee benefit plans,
rather than individual participants, plans purchasing stop-loss insurance
are not deemed "insured" under ERISA.
Because the Bill Gray Plan purchased stop-loss insurance to insure the
Plan from losses in the event its members suffered catastrophic injury
requiring substantial medical payments, it is not an insurance provider
under ERISA. Accordingly the Bill Gray Plan, as an uninsured self-funded
employee benefit plan is exempt from § 1720 of the Pennsylvania Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.
Id. (citations omitted).
166 Id. (citing Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 358 (4th Cir. 1997)
and United Food & Commercial Workers & Employers Ariz. Health & Welfare Trust
v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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regulation of the substantive terms of insurance contracts."167 In
my opinion when a historically ERISA self-funded plan
purchases a stop-gap insurance contract from an insurer to cover
any of the plan's potential risks, it is functionally no longer a
self-funded plan and the contracts of those stop-loss insurers
"are subject to direct state regulation.' 68
I think the purchase of stop-gap insurance alters the plan's
status from an entity without a contract with an insurer to an
entity with a contract with an insurer. When the stop-gap
insurance contract with the insurer provides very limited risk to
either the plan or the employer, the plan should be considered as
substantially insured and saved from preemption by ERISA's
savings clause. 169 While comparing the deemer and saving
clause, the Supreme Court said, "[T]he saving clause retains the
independent effect of protecting state insurance regulation of
insurance contracts purchased by employee benefit plans. 170
Once an historically self-funded plan has substantially altered
its risk of loss by purchasing a stop-gap insurance policy, a state
law that specifically directs insurers selling health insurance to
provide an independent medical necessity review is a law that
regulates insurance under Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans
because such law significantly impacts the risk pooling
arrangement between the selling insurer and the stop-loss
insured plan by requiring all insurance contracts to provide a
claimant with the right to review.1 71 After Kentucky Ass'n of
Health Plans the issue presented when an employer purchases
large amounts of stop-loss insurance is not whether the purchase
allows a self-funded ERISA plan to be regulated as an insurance
company under an ERISA preemption analysis 72 but whether
167 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 62 (1990) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 742-44 (1985)).
168 Id. at 63.
169 See id. at 62-63.
170 Id. at 64.
171 See Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1477-78
(2003).
172 But see Bill Gray Enters. v. Gourley, 248 F.3d 206, 215 (3d Cir. 2001). The
court in Bill Gray Enterprises stated:
But we recognize that a self-funded ERISA plan may purchase such a large
amount of stop-loss insurance that it appears as if the plan is no longer
operating as a self-funded employee benefit plan but rather effectively
operating as an insurance company.... Because there is no evidence that
the Bill Gray Plan purchased an excessive amount of stop-loss insurance,
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such purchase from a common sense view, allows the state to
place a condition 173 of medical necessity review on the right of an
insurance company to sell stop-loss insurance. A state must be
allowed to prohibit entities engaged in selling stop-loss
insurance contracts from shielding illusory self-funded
employers from ERISA's anti-preemptive savings clause by the
simple expedient of purchasing stop-loss insurance.
174
CONCLUSION
I agree with Justice Stevens' dissenting comment about
congressional intent and ERISA self-funded plans made prior to
the Supreme Court's holding Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans.
175
According to Justice Stevens, the real issue for Congress is not
"whether uninsured plans are to be regulated under state
insurance laws" as insurance companies "but whether they
[should] be permitted" at all.176 If there is uncertainty about
whether a federal law preempts a state law, courts must apply
the strong presumption against the cancellation of established
state law. 77 "Application of that presumption leads me to the
conclusion that the pre-emption clause should apply only to
those state laws that purport to regulate subjects regulated by
ERISA or [subjects] that are inconsistent with ERISA's central
purposes."178
Congress could not have rationally intended to bar a state
from implementing the medical necessity provisions of its state
health insurance law "against ERISA plans-most certainly, it
did not intend to pre-empt enforcement"1 79 of state medical
necessity review laws "against self-insured plans" that actually
we do not reach the issue whether the purchase of large amounts of stop-
loss insurance effectively makes a self-funded ERISA plan an insurance
company for ERISA preemption purposes.
Id.
173 See Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 123 S. Ct. at 1477.
174 See Bill Gray Enters., 248 F.3d at 215 ("In this instance the purchase of
large amounts of stop-loss insurance may be evidence that the plan is attempting to
retain the financial security provided by insurance coverage while at the same time
reap the benefits of ERISA preemption, including the avoidance of state laws
regulating reimbursement.").
175 FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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purchase stop loss insurance while preserving implementation of
medical review laws "against insured plans."180  Professor
Zelinsky supports amending ERISA section 514 to allow the
states to control employers self-funded health benefits.181
According to Professor Zelinsky:
Congress should, in the interests of parity, amend section
514 to permit states to extend their regulation of
insurance (including HMOs) to include employers' self-
funded financed health care plans. Without such
amendment of section 514, the regulatory gap persists in
regard to employers' self-financed plans administered
without the participation of an insurance carrier.182
While I support Professor Zelinsky's proposed amendment to
section 514, I think the Court should conclude that Congress
could not have reasonably intended that self-funded plans,
administered with the purchase of stop loss insurance from an
insurance carrier should be excluded from state insurance
regulations "tied to what is medically necessary"18 3 under the
pre-emption rationale.18 4  Since health care is an area of
traditional state regulation, ERISA pre-emption does not apply
unless a clear manifestation of congressional intent is present.18 5
180 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181 Edward A. Zelinsky, Against a Federal Patients'Bill of Rights, 21 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 443, 464 (2003). Unlike Professor Zelinsky, I support a federal patients'
bill of rights.
182 Id.
183 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 2171 (2002).
184 See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185 See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000).
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